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LESS LAW THAN MEETS THE EYE 
David Friedman* 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES. By 
Robert C. Ellickson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. 
Pp. ix, 302. $39.95. 
This book starts with a famous academic parable - Ronald 
Coase's tale of the farmer and the rancher - intended to explicate the 
relation between liability rules and land use. 1 Coase asked how the 
behavior of a farmer and a neighboring rancher would be affected by 
whether the rancher was responsible for damage done by straying cat-
tle. In one of the first statements of what came to be called the Coase 
Theorem, he concluded that, as long as the parties could readily bar-
gain with each other over their actions, the legal rule would affect the 
pattern of side payments - who had to pay what to whom - but not 
the use of the land. 2 
Shasta County, California is a patchwork of open range and closed 
range, designed by the accidents of history to test Coase's conclusion. 
In open range the legal rule holds the farmer responsible for fencing 
out straying cattle, while in closed range the rule is that the rancher is 
responsible for fencing his cattle in. Allowing that real legal rules are 
somewhat more complicated than academic parables, the situation 
corresponds almost exactly to Coase's hypothetical. 
Robert Ellickson3 looked at what happened in Shasta County, us-
ing techniques of investigation modeled on the approach of law-and-
society scholars. He used interviews, aerial photographs, and searches 
of the relevant records to try to discover what actually happened with 
regard to straying cattle, land use, fence building, and a variety of re-
lated issues. He studied an area that included both closed and open 
range over a period that included one successful and one unsuccessful 
attempt by residents to persuade the local board of supervisors to con-
vert territory from open to closed. Ellickson's surprising conclusion: 
Coase was correct in predicting that land use would be unaffected by 
the legal rule; he was incorrect in predicting that side payments would 
be affected. 
* Olin Fellow in Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. 1965, 
Harvard; M.S. 1967, Ph.D. 1971, University of Chicago. - Ed. 
1. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2-8 (1960). 
2. RONALD H. CoASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157-85 (1988); Coase, 
supra note 1. 
3. Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property & Urban Law, Yale University. 
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So far as Ellickson could tell, the legal rule determining who was 
liable when ranchers' cattle strayed onto farmers' land had no effect on 
the behavior of either ranchers or farmers insofar as it involved cattle 
straying onto the farmers' land. His observations and interpretations 
appeared in a series of articles, of which the best known is probably 
"Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County."4 He has now expanded the articles into a book that 
should be of quite general interest to legal academics and many others. 
His argument draws on both the law-and-economics and the law-and-
society traditions, combining economic analysis, anthropology, sociol-
ogy, game theory, and a variety of other approaches to understanding 
human society.5 One of his conclusions is that law is very much less 
important than most of us believe. 
Ellickson discovered that interactions in Shasta County between 
neighbors, with regard to straying cattle and many other things, are 
controlled not by law but by a system of norms, a private law code 
unconnected to courts, legislatures, or any other agency of state 
power. When informed that one of his animals was trespassing, a 
rancher is expected to apologize, retrieve the animal, and take reason-
able precautions to keep it from happening again. If significant dam-
age has been done, the animal's owner is expected to make up for the 
damage - in one case by helping replant a damaged plot of tomatoes 
(pp. 61, 235). 
The system is self-enforcing.· If a rancher consistently lets his ani-
mals stray, or fails to offer to make up for significant damages, the 
victim responds with gossip - spreading the word that the rancher is 
not behaving in a proper neighborly way. If that fails to work, the 
victim may transport straying animals far away - imposing signifi-
cant costs on the owner who has to retrieve them. In extreme cases 
trespassing animals may even be deliberately injured. The one thing 
good neighbors do not do, even under severe provocation, is go to 
court (pp. 60-64). 
Legal rules proved to be irrelevant to more than just the treatment 
of straying cattle. California has quite detailed laws specifying when 
one of two adjoining landowners can build a fence and charge his 
neighbor for part of it. Landowners in Shasta County build fences, 
4. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cottle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). Other articles are Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of 
Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987), and Robert 
C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 
J.L. EcON. & 0RG. 83 (1989). 
5. To exaggerate only a little, the law-and-economics scholars believe that the law-and-
society group is deficient in both sophistication and rigor, and the law-and-society scholars 
believe that the law-and-economics theorists are not only out of touch with reality but also 
short on humanity. 
This book was written with one foot firmly placed in each of these two opposing camps. 
Pp. 7-8. 
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and their neighbors sometimes end up paying for them. But the rele-
vant law has no effect upon what fences get built and who pays for 
them (pp. 69-71). 
Legal rules do seem to have some effect on ranchers' willingness to 
let their cattle stray onto highways, where they might be hit by passing 
motorists. Ranchers are much more careful to avoid such accidents in 
closed range than in open range - that, according to Ellickson, is the 
main reason that people care enough about the legal categories to 
lobby the board of supervisors for and against proposals to close areas 
of previously open range (pp. 82-83, 104-05). Ranchers are more care-
ful because they believe that in open range the driver is strictly liable 
for damages to cattle (the motorist "buys the cow") while in closed 
range the rancher is strictly liable (the rancher "buys the car") (pp. 82, 
104-05). 
Oddly, by Ellickson's account, the ranchers are wrong: whether 
an accident occurs in closed or open range has little or no effect on 
who is liable for what after a collision (pp. 87-93). The one form of 
behavior affected by the legal distinction between closed and open 
range is one to which it is almost irrelevant. 
Ellickson's account of how conflicts involving traffic accidents with 
animals are settled raises a number of different issues. The first, and 
simplest, is why the same people who are almost never willing to go to 
court on one set of issues are frequently willing to do so on another. 
The answer is fairly clear. Both trespass and the construction and 
maintenance of fences involve frequent minor conflicts between neigh-
bors - people locked into a long-term relationship with each other. 
Highway accidents are rare, sometimes large, conflicts between people 
who usually do not know each other and have no reason to expect to 
be in contact in the future. On almost any plausible theory of norms, 
it is easier to use them to deal with the former than the latter sort of 
problem. And indeed it appears, from Ellickson's account, that minor 
highway accidents involving neighbors - the kind of accidents for 
which norms are adequate - do get handled by norms rather than law 
(p. 95). 
The second and harder problem is to explain why ranchers are ig-
norant of the relevant law - why they believe that they "have the 
rights" in open range, when in fact highway accidents in both open 
and closed range are covered by essentially the same rules of negli-
gence. The corresponding ignorance with regard to trespass and fence 
law is easy enough to explain. Since these conflicts are resolved by 
norms rather than by laws, knowledge of the law is of no value to the 
people concerned, and there is no good reason for them to pay the cost 
of acquiring it. They are exhibiting what economists call "rational 
ignorance." 
But accident claims are frequently resolved by law rather than by 
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norms. Furthermore, according to Ellickson, the ranchers' false be-
liefs about the law actually influence their behavior in at least two 
important ways. Farmers who have been grazing their cattle during 
the summer in unfenced areas of open range (typically upland forests 
leased from timber companies, the U.S. Forest Service, or the Bureau 
of Land Management)6 move elsewhere when the range is closed, not 
because they are worried about being sued for trespass but because 
they are afraid that one of their cattle will wander onto a road and be 
involved in an accident, leaving them liable for the damages (pp. 110-
12). And ranchers, whether or not they let their cattle roa,m free, cam-
paign fiercely against proposals to close additional areas of range. 
Assuming that Ellickson has correctly described the law, the 
ranchers' beliefs, and the ranchers' behavior, his observations seem in-
consistent with the economist's usual assumption of rationality. Infor-
mation about law is not free, but it is not all that expensive. 
According to Ellickson, the ranchers are aw~e that the courts in sev-
eral cases have found the owners of cattle liable for accidents that hap-
pened in open range - striking evidence that the ranchers' view of the 
law is wrong. Instead of changing their views, however, they interpret 
the cases as experimental error - the judge got the law wrong. 7 That 
does not look like a rational approach to processing information when 
something valuable is at stake. 
Ellickson's explanation of the paradox is that political clashes over 
proposals to close parts of the range are symbolic rather than actual 
battles. The ranchers are really fighting over status, not liability law. 
By winning, they establish that Shasta County is still Marlboro Coun-
try - a place where the ranchers are in the saddle, politically and 
socially as well as literally. Because they are not willing to admit, even 
to themselves, what they are fighting over, they instead maintain their 
false beliefs about the law in order to provide a plausible excuse for 
their own actions (pp. 114-19). 
As an explanation of political behavior, this may make a good deal 
of sense. If the only decision affected by ranchers' beliefs about the 
law were whether to oppose petitiOns to close the range, then the sym-
bolic stakes involved, although not the sort of values usually included 
in economic analysis, might provide a rational justification for the 
ranchers' actions. Their beliefs would then be a costless way of con-
cealing from themselves and others the nature of what they were 
doing. 
But Ellickson's psychological explanation is much less convincing 
6. These are what Ellickson describes as "traditionalist" ranchers, as distinguished from the 
"modernists" who typically use irrigated, fenced pasture to get their cattle through the summer. 
Pp. 22-25. 
7. "These settlements affronted the cattlemen's belief that a motorist always bears losses aris-
ing out of open-range collisions. The cattlemen were certain that the insurance companies and 
courts, because of either incompetence or gutlessness, had misconstrued the law." P. 99. 
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in the case of ranchers who change where they herd their cattle in 
response to false beliefs about legal liability.8 If acting on more accu-
rate beliefs about the law would make them better off, it is hard to 
believe that there is no excuse they could find for politically opposing 
closed-range ordinances while continuing to herd in closed range.9 
The answer, I think, is that acting on more accurate beliefs about 
the law would not make the ranchers better off. Although their beliefs 
are incorrect, their actions are probably correct. The explanation for 
this paradox is that the cost to a traditionalist rancher - one who lets 
his cattle run free during the summer - of not leasing land in closed 
range areas is essentially zero, since land is available to lease at the 
same price in open range areas. Although the difference in expected 
liability costs between open and closed range is not nearly as great as 
the ranchers believe, it is quite likely, for reasons Ellickson discusses, 
that there is some difference - that under some circumstances an 
animal's owner might be found liable for an accident in closed range 
when he would not in open range. 10 If so, then it makes sense for 
traditionalist ranchers to avoid closed-range areas if they can do so at 
little or no cost. 
This explanation suggests two new puzzles. Why is the price for 
leasing land the same in both areas when the consequence is that the 
owners of unfenced grazing land in closed range have no tenants and 
no rents? Why do the owners not cut the price they charge enough to 
compensate the ranchers for the small increased cost of liability? And, 
given that this is happening, why do we not find that the owners of 
such land, rather than the ranchers who rent it, are the ones leading 
the opposition to petitions to convert areas from open to closed range? 
It is the landowners, after all, who are actually bearing the cost of the 
conversion. 
8. The false belief about the liability consequences of open versus closed range might also 
impose costs on modernist ranchers, who use fenced range, since it could induce them to take 
additional precautions to make sure their cattle never got out. According to Ellickson, such 
effects are meager at best. Pp. 112-13. 
9. They could, for example, claim that they were continuing to herd cattle in the closed· 
range areas despite the risk of liability claims or higher insurance, thus representing themselves 
to themselves as bravely bearing the cost of maintaining the ranchers' way of life against adverse 
conditions. 
10. As Ellickson explains: 
Although formal legal analysis thus suggests that a closed-range ordinance should have no 
evidentiary weight in a collision case, the fact of a closure might in practice increase a 
motorist's chances of prevailing for a number of reasons. First, if a collision case were to be 
litigated, a trial judge might allow a motorist to introduce the fact that the collision had 
occurred in closed range as evidence that the cattleman had been negligent •••• Second, a 
Shasta county ordinance makes it unlawful for a livestock owner, other than an owner of 
"livestock upon the open range," to permit his animals "to habitually trespass" on public 
property (such as a highway) ..•• a closure may in fact somewhat increase motorists' pros-
pects in collision cases, although certainly not by as much as the cattlemen's folklore would 
have it. 
Pp. 92-93. 
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The answer to both questions is very simple. Most of the land used 
for unfenced grazing is owned by either the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment or the U.S. Forest Service. Neither organization is willing to 
delegate to its local agents the authority to set prices - with the result 
that both of them charge a uniform price for grazing leases across the 
entire western United States. The remaining land is owned by large 
timber companies, whose policies are only slightly more :flexible (pp. 
105-06). The amounts at stake in grazing leases on upland forests are 
not large enough to make it worth the cost, to either the public or the 
private owners, of overcoming the principal-agent problems that pre-
vent them from either fine-tuning their leases or intervening in local 
politics to prevent areas they own from being closed. 
If the explanation I have offered is correct, then Ellickson's ac-
count of how ranchers behave is consistent with conventional eco-
nomic ideas of rationality. Rationality, after all, is an assumption 
about what people do, not why they say they do it. Ellickson's expla-
nation of why ranchers persist with their false beliefs does suggest in-
teresting possibilities about why holding false beliefs may be rational 
- not because the beliefs are true, but because they are useful. 
Ellickson does not limit his discussion to Shasta County. He also 
discusses, in somewhat less detail, norms that apply to orchard men in 
the Pacific Northwest (p. 189), whalers in the nineteenth century (pp. 
191-204), and modem American academics (pp. 258-64). The last ex-
ample is the cruelest, at least so far as his academic readers are con-
cerned, since he offers evidence that professors, in photocopying each 
other's articles, ignore the relevant copyright laws while adhering to 
professional norms well-designed to serve the interests of our academic 
community - in some cases at the expense of our publishers. 
One of the charms of the descriptive first half of Ellickson's book is 
the way in which it uses simple observations of the real world to throw 
cold water into the faces oflegal theorists of almost all sorts. It is hard 
to see how legal rules can serve the roles assigned to them by doctrinal 
scholars, economists, feminists, or practically anyone else, if nobody 
pays any attention to them. 
Part of what Ellickson accomplishes in this book is an attack on 
legal centralism, the doctrine that assigns law a central role in deter-
mining what people do and what society is like. His purpose, how-
ever, is constructive. It is to explain the nature of the institutions that 
actually do a large part of what law is supposed to do. His central 
thesis is simple: close-knit groups tend to develop efficient norms. He 
concludes that while formal law is important and useful in human af-
fairs, it is less important and less useful than generally believed. In a 
wide variety of situations, people not only succeed in resolving their 
conflicts without recourse to law, they do it by mechanisms that work 
considerably better than the legal system. 
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One important issue Ellickson does not explore is where such 
norms come from and why they tend to be efficient. If rules are well-
designed, the obvious explanation is that someone designed them. 
While there may be some systems of religious norms that are actually 
the result of deliberate design, that does not seem a very plausible ex-
planation for the norms that apply to straying cattle and fence build-
ing in Shasta County, or to those that determined who owned a whale 
when two different ships had been involved in killing it. 
The obvious alternative to deliberate planning is evolution. Per-
haps, over time, societies with better norms conquer, absorb, or are 
imitated by societies with worse norms, producing a world of well-
designed societies. The problem with this explanation is that such a 
process should take centuries, if not millennia - which does not fit the 
facts as Ellickson reports them. Whaling norms, for example, seem to 
have adjusted rapidly to changes in the species being hunted. 
Perhaps what is happening is evolution, but evolution involving 
much smaller and more fluid groups than entire societies. Consider a 
norm, such as honesty, that can profitably be followed by small groups 
within a society, applicable only within the group. Groups with effi-
cient norms will prosper and grow by recruitment. Others will imitate 
them. Groups with similar norms will tend to fuse, in order to obtain 
the same benefits on a larger scale. If one system of norms works 
better than its competitors, it will eventually spread through the entire 
society. When circumstances change and new problems arise the pro-
cess can repeat itself on a smaller scale, generating modified norms to 
deal with the new problems. 
This conjecture about how norms arise and change suggests a pre-
diction: even if a norm is efficient, it will not arise if its benefits depend 
on everyone's following it. Consider the whaling norms that Ellickson 
discusses. Any pair of captains has an interest in agreeing in advance 
to an efficient rule for dealing with whales that one ship harpoons and 
another one brings in, just as a pair of individuals has an interest in 
agreeing to be honest with each other. But a rule for holding down the 
total number of whales killed so as to preserve the population of 
whales is useful only if everyone follows it. The former type of norm 
existed, the latter did not - with the result that nineteenth-century 
whalers did an efficient job of hunting one species after another to near 
extinction. I I 
11. A slightly different way of putting this argument is to say that we are observing what 
Dawkins has described as the evolution of "memes": ideas evolving in an environment consisting 
of the minds of humans. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 203-15 (1976). One 
reason a meme - such as the belief that "one ought to be honest towards honest people" - will 
spread is that those holding it are observed to be more successful as a result. But in order for the 
process to get past the early stage, when the meme is still rare in the population, it must be useful 
to hold the meme even when most other people do not. This works for memes representing 
norms such as honesty, but it does not work for a meme for conservation of whales, which raises 
the very interesting questions of why memes in favor of conservation have recently spread so 
May 1992] Less Law Than Meets the Eye 1451 
This conjecture explains one feature of the norms that Ellickson 
observes - their apparent failure to deal with certain sorts of 
problems. Ellickson discusses at least two other superficially puzzling 
features. One is the tendency to use inefficient punishments to enforce 
norms (pp. 217-19). A second is the apparent preference for non-
monetary over monetary payments (pp. 234-35). 
For an example of an inefficient punishment, consider the case of 
straying cattle. Suppose that, for the tenth time, a herd of your cattle 
breaks down my fence and destroys my garden. I know from the pre-
vious nine incidents that calling you up to complain will do no good 
- you will retrieve the cattle but do nothing to reimburse me for my 
damages. Calling up a lawyer and suing you would violate the strong 
norm against taking neighbors to court. What do I do? 
The obvious efficient solution, at least in a rural context, is to con-
vert one of the ten animals into packages of meat in my deep freeze, 
then call you up to complain that nine of your cattle have gotten into 
my garden. I thus punish you and reimburse myself simultaneously. 
After a few repetitions you are likely to get the point - and if not, at 
least I will eat well. 
This solution is obvious and seems efficient, but it is not what hap-
pens. Instead of slaughtering one animal, I drive the whole herd to 
some inconvenient location many miles from both my farm and your 
ranch. Instead of imposing costs on you in a way that benefits me, 
thus holding down the net cost of the punishment, I use a punishment 
that is costly for both of us. Why? 
Ellickson recognizes the problem and suggests, though he does not 
fully explicate, the answer. In his words, "[t]he major disadvantage of 
a seizure, as opposed to a destruction, is that someone who loses prop-
erty to an intentional taker is more likely to interpret the event as an 
act of initial aggression than as an exercise in self-help" (p. 216). 
The issue is not merely one of misinterpretation. As Locke pointed 
out many years ago, every man is a biased judge in his own case.12 If 
the victim, sitting as his own judge and jury, knows that the higher the 
punishment he imposes the larger his own benefit, he will have a 
strong incentive to find the defendant guilty. 13 If the punishment is 
costly for both parties, the victim will only be willing to impose it 
rapidly within our current population - to the point where belief in conservation has become 
very nearly the secular equivalent of a state religion. 
12. See JOHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 191-92 (2d. ed., George 
Routledge & Sons 1887) (1690). 
13. In the context of law rather than norms, this is one argument against using efficient 
punishments such as forcing convicted criminals to "work off" their debt to society - it gives 
the court system an incentive to lower its standard of proof when the local government decides 
that it needs convict labor to build a road. A good fictional statement of the argument, in the 
context of the proposal that those guilty of capital crimes should forfeit their organs (for trans-
plants) as well as their lives, is in Larry Niven, The Jigsaw Man, in ALL THE MYRIAD WAYS 45 
(1971). 
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when he really believes that the trespasser has been behaving unrea-
sonably and must be stopped. The victim, knowing that, will be much 
more willing to accept the judgment and reform his behavior. Thus a 
norm limiting the injured party to inefficient punishments is actually 
an efficient rule. It raises the cost of punishment, but it makes it much 
more likely that a punishment will have its desired effect and, less 
likely that it will set off an escalating feud. 14 
The second puzzle is why the equivalent of damage payments in a 
system of norms takes a nonmonetary form - reimbursing a neighbor 
by helping him replant his garden instead of simply paying for the 
damage done. Ellickson's explanation is that cash transactions are 
"cold and impersonal . . . . A constitutive norm favoring in-kind 
transfers . . . puts members through the ritual of signalling that they 
are in solidarity, rather than at arm's length" (p. 235). But this fails to 
explain why money transactions are seen as cold, and whether this 
perception, and this characteristic of Shasta County norms, apply 
more generally. In plenty of societies, after all, money is explicitly 
involved in marriage arrangements, even though an important element 
of such arrangements is the creation of solidarity between the newly 
related kindreds. In one of the most famous feuds 'in literature, the 
killing match in Njal's Saga, 15 Njal and Gunnar maintain the peace by 
passing a purse of silver back and forth to compensate each other for 
the killings alternately instigated by their feuding wives. 
Robert Ellickson does not, and cannot be expected to, fully answer 
all of the questions that he raises. Understanding the nature of nonle-
gal norms is a hard problem, and any adequate theory of such norms 
will almost certainly draw on a variety of different sorts of expertise, 
probably including economics, game theory, and anthropology as well 
as law. What he does do is make it overwhelmingly clear that nonle-
gal norms are a complex and important topic and make a reasonable 
start at sketching out an approach to understanding them. 
14. An even better norm would be one that required punishments that were costly to both 
parties but benefited other members of the society - slaughtering the animal and donating it to 
the local soup kitchen, for example. This might not work for small groups, since potential benefi-
ciaries might conspire with the "victim" to induce him to impose the punishment even when it 
was not deserved - and, for reasons discussed above, a norm that does not work for small 
groups is unlikely to develop. 
15. NIAL'S SAGA 81-87 (Carl F. Bayer Schmidt & Lee Hollander trans., 1955). 
